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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper attends the live music performance in the 21st century to reconsider 
German philosopher Walter Benjamin’s theses on the authenticity of art in his 1935 
essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Benjamin focuses on 
the emergent technology of photography in the 20th century as a method of technical 
reproduction of the art object, and, as he indicates, as having “captured a place of its own 
among the artistic processes” (219-20). Benjamin proposes several theories on the 
mechanical reproducibility and distribution of art within the culture industry, and his 
attention to the aura of the art object—“its unique existence at the place where it happens 
to be”—is, in my argument, reimagined in an age of digitally-mediated art practice. The 
ephemeral experience of live musical performance, I maintain, presents the requisite 
space-time to reevaluate the integrity of the art object’s aura. At the core of this analysis 
is the connection between the digital reproduction’s aura and its influence on human 
apperception, much like how the “Work of Art” essay is structured. Thus, the shift in the 
mode of reproducibility—from the mechanical to the digital—reflects a larger change in 
the mode of human apperception. Specifically, I am considering the use of digital devices 
by individual—and, more-specifically, non-professional—audience members to capture 
and reproduce a live music performance. This analysis repositions Benjamin’s theses on 
the authenticity of art in the 21st century to contextualize how capturing something as 
authentic yet as fleeting as music—especially through a digital device that is rarely out of 
arm’s reach—can answer the larger questions of who we are as authentic, individual 
beings and how the human experience is contextualized.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION: iPHONES AT THE CONCERT 
 
 
The ephemeral nature of music1 precipitates a reflection on the authenticity and 
authority of art. What is considered original and authentic when each iteration—each 
sound encountered in a unique spacetime—comes and goes in a more transitory manner 
than would, for example, the observation of a painting? Authenticity of art is the central 
theme of German philosopher Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” What is at stake for Benjamin in an age of 
reproducibility is the integrity of the aura of the art object and, subsequently, the 
influence of the mode of reproduction on human apperception—or, how we contextualize 
the world around us.2 Benjamin defines aura as the element of the original that anchors 
its presence to a specific time and space: “its unique existence at the place where it 
happens to be” (220). Reproduction is furthermore identified as the act that threatens the 
auratic integrity of the original. “In principle a work of art has always been reproducible” 
(218), emphasizes Benjamin. But replicas—the product of manual reproduction—are the 
precursors to technical reproduction. These replicas were produced by artists and masters 
for the purposes of improving their craft but were also carried out by those seeking 
financial gain—branded by Benjamin as forgery. “Mechanical reproduction,” Benjamin 
makes plain, “represents something new” (218), a grand “shattering of tradition” that had 
yet to be fully critiqued in the early 20th century. 
                                                 
1 See "ephemeral, adj. and n."  
2 See "apperception, n." 
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Benjamin’s approach to this upset of tradition in art practice positioned him to 
make a larger observation on society’s desire to eliminate distance. Essentially, he is 
using his theses on art as an anchor by which to solidify more of a societal critique as 
opposed to a simply artistic one. He describes the auratic component of distance through 
the example of encountering a mountain range or the shadow cast from a tree branch—
phenomena of nature. As you “follow with your eyes” these distant vistas (far or near), 
“you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch” (222-23). Benjamin’s 
critique gives voice to the inability to physically reach into the distance and capture those 
mountains or that tree branch. Technical reproducibility, he concludes, is a way for the 
viewer to eliminate that distance, a way to bring home whatever view one choses to 
frame through the lens of a camera. Photography thus created a rift in the standard3 of 
representation in that, before, only the artist—the painter, the sculptor—could represent 
some semblance of reality through art “in its traditional form” (220).  
Criticism in the wake of the “Work of Art” essay follows Benjamin in focusing on 
auratic decline in the plastic arts. However, the digital reproducibility of art, I am urging, 
requires a critique of music as a more ephemeral sphere of art practice. The ephemerality 
of music and the comparatively more sophisticated nature of digital reproduction allows 
my argument to explore a deeper change within human apperception. This “deeper 
change,” I intend to show, will surpass the desire to eliminate distance in its importance 
to the human experience. To be clear, this discussion is not an affront to Benjamin’s 
theses on art and its reflection of society; instead, it will launch the “Work of Art” essay 
                                                 
3 See Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” p. 219. 
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into the present moment as an introduction for a contemporary discussion on the methods 
of digital reproducibility.  
Music, of course, takes center-stage, but why shift the focus away from 
photography? After all, photography has by now adapted itself well within the realm of 
the digital. But photography today—even in its highly advanced digital form—still 
embodies many of the limitations of the plastic. For instance, the digital photograph can 
be modified using the DSLR camera that first captured it or by using computer software 
like Adobe’s Photoshop, but the final product (again, like a finished painting) is a static, 
fixed image. The digitally reproduced live music performance, however, is 
comprehended by the audible and visual sensorium, which will later be considered as it 
relates to passivity versus concentration and the mode of reproduction’s influence on aura 
and apperception. At its core, this analysis takes Benjamin’s theses on the authenticity of 
art into the 21st century to help contextualize how capturing something as authentic yet as 
fleeting as music—especially through a digital device that is rarely out of arm’s reach—
can help answer the larger questions of who we are as authentic, individual beings and 
how the human experience is contextualized. 
Benjamin employed photography as the anchor by which to observe mass 
culture’s commodification of art. Photographic technology was, at that time, the perfect 
platform to discuss aura in tandem with, as he maintains, “[society’s] bent toward 
overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction” (223). Live 
music as an art object, however, is complicated not only by reproduction of the visual 
element of the performance but also by the added dimension of audio’s digital 
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transformation. Carl Dahlhaus’ Esthetics of Music sheds light on the sophistication of 
music’s objectivity—music as “a focus of esthetic contemplation.” He begins by aligning 
music’s foundation with a more plastic artform like painting.4 Both occur—are produced 
and consumed—in space. Music, on the other hand and simultaneously, works in time 
unlike the painting: not in the sense the it requires time for the artist to create a still life 
with oil on canvas, but time as a mode by which to exchange the musical tones from 
musician to audience.5 And Dahlhaus counters his generosity of music’s relation to the 
plastic arts further by writing, “[music’s] objectivity is displayed not so much 
immediately as indirectly: not in the moment when it is sounding, but only if a 
listener…reverts to what has passed and recalls it into his present experience as a closed 
whole” (11). The objectivity of music, therefore, requires a specificity of time and space, 
much like how Benjamin frames aura.  
In this essay, I apply Benjamin’s theses on art to the digital reproducibility of live 
music. My argument is then solidified by reimagining auratic integrity—from original to 
digitally reproduced copy—within mass culture’s access to portable digital reproduction 
devices like Apple’s iPhone. As a millennial growing up in what I would refer to as the 
electronic and digital cultural revolution of the late 1990s and early 2000s, I find that the 
most recognizable device is the iPhone. Other smartphone devices are available on the 
market, but, for the sake of simplicity, I will reference the iPhone in lieu of other 
platforms by Android, Samsung, and Google. Unlike other companies, though, Apple has 
                                                 
4 See Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, p. 9. 
5 Ibid.  
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worked with audio and video engineers to allow performers to disable the recording of 
their live performance.6 This patented technology (US Patent 9,380,225), according to an 
NPR report, “would use infrared emitters to temporarily deactivate the photo and video 
capabilities on devices like mobile phones, laptops, stand-alone video or still cameras or 
any other ‘electronic device with an image sensor’” (Tsioulcas). A closer look into the 
breakdown of the technology can arguably conclude that the “infrared data” received by 
the system would also make capable the capturing of all data being fed into the system. 
Essentially, this digital reproduction technology created to bar the use of mobile phones 
and other devices at a live performance could simultaneously be used to crowd-source 
“data” (or information) that could, in turn, be able to produce something like the Beastie 
Boys’ 2006 production, Awesome; I Fuckin’ Shot That! According to London-based 
media critic Patrick Tarrant,7 the film was produced from raw footage taken by 50 fans 
who were given cameras to film the show from their own vantage point. Tarrant 
describes Awesome as “a collage-like concert documentary” inspired by a fan’s previous 
phone recording uploaded to the band’s website.8 The 2004 concert, held at Madison 
Square Garden, presented a novel opportunity for the music industry to capitalize on 
audience participation. Apple’s 2016 patent, as well as the Beastie Boys’ Awesome, are 
exceptional cases in digital recording capabilities in the 21st century. After a close reading 
of Benjamin’s theses on aura and mass culture’s yielding to reproducibility, it is not 
surprising to encounter such cases in an age defined by increasing access to digital 
                                                 
6 See Tiscareno, et al. 
7 See Tarrant, “Camera Movies.” 
8 Tarrant, “Camera Movies,” p. 156. 
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technology. But are we now concentrating on the work of art or are we concentrating on 
the work of art as it appears through the screen? Or is it now the device that is the focal 
point of our attention? 
The “increasing significance of the masses” in 20th century industrialized society 
provided Benjamin with the opportunity to single out, as he observes, “the desire…to 
bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (223). No longer limited to the expert or 
professional, the act of eradicating distance between the work of art is conducted by the 
growing numbers of people equipped with multi-modal smartphones. Typically framed 
by the polarity of distraction and concentration before art, Benjamin later remarks, “A 
man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it… In contrast, the distracted 
mass absorbs the work of art” (239). Arresting art not by machine but through a more 
intimate relationship with the device thus allows a renewed cultural standpoint by which 
to observe a shift in the mode of human apperception that Benjamin considers only 
briefly in his theses on art. And live music performance, a more ephemeral artform than 
photography, is employed in this discussion on art in the digital age in order to illustrate a 
renewed shift in the mode of apperception in the 21st century. 
This critique, like the “Work of Art” essay, considers both the integrity of aura 
and human apperception—not as separate, but as codependent. While Benjamin bridges 
the gap between aura’s integrity and human apperception by commenting on the desire to 
collapse distance in the age of mechanical reproduction, this argument emphasizes the 
authenticity of self within the individual human experience as it relates to art practice and 
the reproduction of the art object in the 21st century. The ephemeral nature of music in its 
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most basic form—that which, like Benjamin’s aura, is only encountered in a singular 
space and time—is predicated by the fleeting original that is, today, reproduced by the 
digital devices found in the hands of millions. Here I argue that the device—its 
functionality and multimodality—has evolved from a tool to a kind of sacred tether to the 
modern world. This multi-dimensional approach to artistic experience is another avenue 
where Benjamin’s theses on art breaks down when applied to 21st century digital 
reproduction. For the mechanically reproduced copy, while still capable of modifications, 
will be shown as comparatively static next to the digital reproduction and the affordances 
the device allows its remixability. Thus, the digital age, I will present here, has the 
potential—much like what is at stake in the “Work of Art” essay’s critique on the 
technical reproducibility of art—to influence human sense perception on an objectively 
deeper level than a desire to bring objects closer. While the elimination of distance is still 
an integral component of reproducibility in the digital age, I argue that it is being 
conducted in the present moment to bring closer an authentic sense of self to the 
individual behind the device.  
In sum, a shift in the mode of reproducibility reflects a larger change in the mode 
of human apperception. For Benjamin, the shift and its technocratic byproducts were 
successfully exemplified in the reproduction of the plastic arts. I, however, am observing 
digital reproduction in a more fleeting medium of art, one beyond the static nature of 
photography that embodies an ever-changing and increasingly global society. Music is 
transitory and fluid in a way that can help to illustrate the speed at which events occur, 
statuses change, and perception fluctuates in the modern age. Questioning the 
 8 
authenticity of an ephemeral artform allows a subsequent questioning of the authenticity 
of the self—individual identity in an age of information and digital communication—
which exemplifies the shift in the mode of human apperception in the 21st century. While 
it is difficult to predict what will render digital reproducibility obsolete (or, at least, be 
considered in the past tense), the ephemeral nature of music and its digital reproducibility 
distinguishes the artform from all others. This essay examines—as did Benjamin in the 
20th century—the current mode of human apperception at a time when the ephemeral is 
endangered by an even more prolific mode of reproducibility, one that is not necessarily 
produced by but is, rather, a reflection of 21st century mass culture. This historical 
moment is not novel in the endangerment of aura or the ephemerality of music. Their 
integrity is in the hands not of those who were once—as Adorno notes—in charge of the 
culture industry; however, the individual has the opportunity to engage with integrity 
through the do-it-yourself reproduction platforms given agency by the digital device. 
 9 
AURA & APPERCEPTION IN THE AGE OF BENJAMIN 
 
 
Benjamin’s account of aura is ultimately a phenomenon perceived by the 
individual lover of art. Yet, for much of art history’s absence of reproduction’s 
distributive potential, art was exclusive to an elite class with privileged access. To view 
art in its original form required travel and access to galleries that were, for much of 
society, economically out of reach. Following a proliferation of art by way of technical 
reproduction, it makes sense that the “Work of Art” essay comments on changes in “the 
medium of contemporary perception” (222), but Benjamin’s distribution of attention on 
aura and apperception is significantly skewed. On only two occasions in his essay does 
he mention the symptoms of “profound changes in apperception” (240); the focus is on 
the mechanical reproducibility of art by means of photography and its consequences for 
aura. Reproduction technology of the 20th century was in the beginning stages of cultural 
integration, and photography was easily-made the focal point of Benjamin’s critique. For 
the first time in history, Benjamin observes, the technical reproducibility of art had been 
employed on a mass scale. A significant passage at the beginning of Benjamin’s critique 
stipulates: 
Around 1900 technical reproduction had reached a standard that not only 
permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause the most 
profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its 
own among the artistic processes. (219-220) 
Reproduction as an artistic practice was arguably an affront to art for Benjamin and his 
contemporaries. Benjamin critiques the birth of photography as having liberated the hand 
 10 
of “the most important artistic functions which henceforth devolved only upon the eye 
looking into a lens” (219). For Benjamin, this “shattering of tradition” occurred when the 
machine replaced what the artist had before accomplished by hand and with simple tools. 
Digital reproducibility, however—introduced in the final decade of the 20th century and 
flourishing in the 21st—represents something novel all over again, for both the integrity 
of aura and how the mode of human apperception is interpreted today. One significant 
departure from the age of mechanical reproducibility is the widespread public access to 
digital devices, which are produced in such quantities as to be affordable to a greater 
number of people. Furthermore, the present moment is witnessing an age of travel and 
mobility that helps to dissolve the privileged access to art that before was only afforded 
to an elite class of patrons.  
Scholars from Theodor Adorno to Miriam Hansen consider the integrity of 
Benjamin’s aura as degraded following the original work of art’s technical reproduction 
and mass distribution. Adorno’s The Culture Industry provides a critical foundation to 
both Benjamin and his theses on art as well as my work to further aura and apperception 
in the context of 21st century live music. Adorno contextualizes the work of art within the 
schema of mass culture by describing the art object as forming “the technique of 
reproduction and presentation, actually a technique for the distribution of a real object” 
(64). Monopolization, though, is Adorno’s focus in his critique of auratic integrity. He 
considers the habit of the culture industry to mass-produce and monopolize art to be 
impeding its singular value or, more clearly stated: “decisive aspects of reality today 
elude representation through the aesthetic image” (65). While mechanical reproducibility 
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introduced art to the general public on a mass scale, its omnipresence eventually led to 
the dismemberment of aura as Adorno and Benjamin feared. Much later, Miriam 
Hansen—in “Aura: The Appropriation of a Concept”—would claim that aura according 
to Benjamin is “unstable, metamorphic, and relational,” imbued with a “dependence on 
particular constellations and acts of reading and interpretation” (119). Here, Hansen steps 
away from the public arena to consider the potential of the individual and the singular 
approach to the art object’s aura. The onus of appreciation rests not with everyone, but 
with you. Both Adorno and Hansen, while writing at different points in critical history 
and each with a specific critical agenda, are acknowledging a rift in the artistic tradition 
that preceded their present. Any degradation of aura—whether observed by Benjamin, 
Adorno, or a more contemporary critic like Hansen—is arguably regarded as an offense 
to tradition, and the relatively stable history of art practice lends itself to this kind of 
sensitivity. Each of these scholars approach the critical table with a unique agenda, and I 
would argue that changes in the tradition of art practice give them pause to consider what 
these changes (including their benefits and negative consequences) may bring to the 
public art audience. 
Much like the historical moment during which Benjamin encountered aura, its 
significance and meaning have been shown by contemporary scholars to be changing in 
the age of digital reproduction. Miriam Hansen continues to reimagine aura’s integrity in 
her Benjamin-defying essay.9 Her stance classifies the “withering” of aura as 
“symptomatic” of “a fundamental shift in the conditions of human sense perception that 
                                                 
9 See Hansen, “Aura: The Appropriation of a Concept” 
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Benjamin in turn attributes to both the new technologies of reproduction and the 
increasing importance of the masses in modern life” (113-14). Thus, technology and 
society eventually reach a point of homeostasis following any new incorporation of the 
former into quotidian life. And once some other technology is introduced, the cycle 
begins anew. Hansen furthers her approach to Benjamin’s reconsideration of experience 
as entailing an exploration of “new modes of apperception and adaptation equal to a 
technologically changed and changing environment” (105). In a way, she has 
summarized the impetus of the present study, which is being conducted in response to 
changes in the way art is reproduced. Hansen also points to traces of optimism in 
Benjamin’s account, as his efforts “revolved around the possibility that the new 
technological media could reactivate older potentials of perception and imagination that 
would enable human beings to engage productively, at a sensorial and collective level, 
with modern forms of self-alienation” (105). This perceptive and imaginative potential I 
am here observing within the realm of live music performance and, thus, reimagined 
within the sphere of digital reproducibility to illustrate an indeed productive approach to 
digitally mediated apperception. For digital reproducibility is not an ideology of 
apperception—it is an act used to illustrate digital communication & reproduction 
technologies as an aid in understanding human apperception and more contemporary 
forms of self-alienation—forms which will be explored below. 
The novelty in copying the work of art by means of technical reproducibility 
“represents something new,” just as much today as it did during the early 20th century. 
Benjamin begins his critical theory focused on how the mode of reproducibility affects 
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aura. “In principle a work of art has always been reproducible” (218), he claims. Here, 
Benjamin is differentiating between replicas and reproductions. Replicas of art objects 
were historically created either for practice (by pupils), dissemination (by artists), or 
profit (“by third parties in the pursuit of gain”) from the work of art (218). These copies 
were considered to be replicated by the mode of manual reproduction—no machine or 
device was involved at all, save for the more traditional tools the artist may use. A 
replica— “confronted with its manual reproduction”—was regarded as a forgery. 
Reproductions, argues Benjamin, employed a more technical mode than before. By 
foregoing the human hand for the components of machinery, the reproduced art object is, 
thus, labeled a copy. And while the divide between what is to be considered a copy and a 
forgery is dependent upon the purpose of the reproduction, this divide—although not 
central to this argument—I would predict becomes increasingly troubled in the digital 
reproduction. 
Rather late in the “Work of Art” essay, Benjamin mentions the concept of 
apperception in tandem with his attention to aura. His analysis is on a decrescendo, and 
he affords noticeably little time to explore the consequences of a shift in the mode of 
reproducibility on the psyche of the individual or mass culture at large. Again, this 
analysis is not attempting to discredit Benjamin—by Section XV of the “Work of Art” 
essay, the amount of critical ground already covered is immense, and this final section’s 
discussion (which precedes his Epilogue) is compounding on the work accomplished 
earlier in the essay. The genesis of my critical exploration into Benjamin’s theses was not 
where he ends with apperception, but to bring his novel analytical model into the present 
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moment and devote more time to explore the potentials of analyzing the human 
experience through the lens of art. Thus, live music is merely the anchor—the tip of a 
deeper social iceberg—by which to acknowledge apperception’s metamorphosis in the 
21st century.  
Apperception describes how humans contextualize something newly encountered 
by incorporating it into the mass of experience already possessed in order to comprehend 
it within the larger whole of their consciousness. Benjamin stipulates that the desire to 
reproduce an art object as “symptomatic of profound changes in apperception” (240). He 
critiques this desire by observing how the reproduction of art eliminates a necessary 
distance between object and audience. This distance is vital to the integrity of aura, just 
as the inability to fully capture a mountain range is arguably what adds to their grandeur. 
Not only does Benjamin pin down the changing integrity of aura through reproduction 
and the shattering of tradition that its technical reproduction elicits, he essentially is 
asking why this is happening, why mass culture is moving in this direction, and how 
reproducibility takes such an influential position over society. Benjamin states, “the mode 
of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence” (222). I, 
too, believe that one’s mode of existence has a direct bearing on how their world is 
perceived. This mode, supports Benjamin, “is determined not only by nature but by 
historical circumstances as well… And if changes in the medium of contemporary 
perception can be comprehended as decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social 
causes” (222). I would argue that this statement is the most succinct in explaining what 
Benjamin is up to in his theses on art—and what I hope to continue. For the social causes 
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resulting not only from the introduction of technical reproducibility of art but also from 
the shift in the mode of its reproducibility—from the mechanical to the digital—is the 
theoretical basis for understanding questions surrounding a troubled sense of self in the 
present moment. 
The “Work of Art” essay, however, is largely devoted to the effects mechanical 
reproduction has on the art object’s aura. While Benjamin and others like Adorno10 point 
to the degradation of society as a reflection on the decay of aura, Benjamin’s analysis 
provides a mere glimpse into the shape these possibilities could take. And while this 
analysis is not being conducted to answer the question of why, in his essay, so little space 
is afforded to reproducibility’s effect on how society perceives their individual reality, 
there are a number of possibilities. Two examples are found when considering the still-
developing field of psychology in the early 20th century as well as Benjamin’s limited 
access to resources during his research in an age far more analog (i.e. no computers or 
web-based search engines) than the present one. Nevertheless, what Benjamin has done 
in his theses on art is provide the critical foundation for understanding the individual’s 
sense of self in an arguably more sophisticated, complicated age. Without the “Work of 
Art” essay, I am unsure this type of analysis could be conducted at all.  
  
                                                 
10 See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music 
 16 
FINDING THE EPHEMERAL:  
LIVE MUSIC REPRODUCTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Music is ephemeral: its most basic existence is only experienced at the moment of 
encounter, in a singular time and space before disappearing. “You can’t touch music,” 
announces David Byrne, vocalist and guitarist of The Talking Heads. In his meditation on 
How Music Works, he continues: “and yet [music] can profoundly alter how we view the 
world and our place in it” (9). Perhaps the ability of music to elude the physical grasp of 
listeners while still enacting profound changes in their lives has led to a mix of attraction 
and frustration in the human conscience since music was first practiced. While Byrne was 
a touring musician in the 1980s, Carl Dahlhaus was describing music as transitory in his 
Esthetics of Music: “It goes by, instead of holding still for inspection” (11). Notes from a 
piano, vibrations from a cello—the sounds of music cannot be framed and exhibited in a 
gallery. Although music is arguably the most fleeting artform, perhaps it is the 
ephemerality of music that makes it so ubiquitously received by the human sensorium. 
Perhaps it is music—and not a more plastic artform like photography or painting—that 
encapsulates what it means to be, only existing in the moment without any connection to 
past or future. Reproducing something with such an interpretive potential is troubled the 
more it is copied, the more it engages with the non-human element of the machine or the 
device. 
But reproducing a static art object—an original that can be encountered in 
multiple space-times—is only a shallow approach to the potentials of the concept of aura 
in the age of digital reproducibility. During the early 20th century, static reproductions of 
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art—in the form of photographs—were an enormous feat. Riding on the shoulders of 
lithography, photography marked a paradigmatic shift in the way images could be 
captured: the world slowed to a halt for passers-by to observe, but in stunning detail that 
the human hand before could not capture with canvas and paint. Benjamin points out that 
“photography freed the hand of the most important artistic functions which henceforth 
devolved only upon the eye looking into a lens. Since the eye perceives more swiftly than 
the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was accelerated so enormously 
that it could keep pace with speech” (219). Reproducing art at this speed allowed a quick 
incorporation of aesthetic value into the culture industry that had never before been able 
to circulate. This incorporation included images of such quality—and consistency—into 
the more traditional (i.e. textual) content that was being disseminated in advertisements, 
newspaper magazines, and eventually in motion pictures. 
Yet copies in the digital age take a new form and are subsequently charged with 
different affordances. One difference between music recordings of the age of mechanical 
reproducibility and the music industry today is that the line between producer and 
consumer is becoming increasingly blurred with the convenience and portability of the 
iPhone’s digital recording capabilities—making an audience member at a live 
performance able to arrest the art object and immortalize it through the lens of their 
digital device. Because one cannot “take home” the original—like Benjamin could not 
arrest for his own safekeeping the mountain range or the tree branch’s shadow—its 
reproduction retains some semblance of what was beheld. Unlike the final product in the 
machine age, however, the “final destination” of the digital reproduction inhabits a 
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similarly ephemeral realm in that the act of reproduction—the conversion of art to 
information—is rarely the last step. The digital copy can be further remixed and 
modified, therefore introducing the affordance of auratic change either during or long 
after reproduction. In the case of live music performance, the reproduction can be 
captured and modified while the individual behind the device is still experiencing the 
singularity of the original. Compared to the technical reproducibility of Benjamin’s 
observations, the 21st century approach to the work of art happens on a temporal scale 
that is far narrower than the time it took to complete the reproduction process in the 20th 
century. The result of such speed in reproduction—within this discussion on 21st century 
music—affects not only how art is approached and appreciated by the individual “lover 
of art,” but also how the individual approaches and appreciates their reality before, 
during, and after the performance.  
The plastic arts that preceded the age of Benjamin led to the birth of photography 
and the potential for machinic reproduction to influence the way humans perceive their 
everyday reality. But the machine not only copied the image, it helped to transport it on a 
scale far wider than imagery had ever before been distributed. Although concentrating on 
the image in the digital world, Boris Groys11 helps to contextualize the parallel that 
anything digital does not need the exhibition space. Because of their reproducibility, they 
travel “spontaneously and anonymously throughout the open fields of contemporary 
means of communication, such as the Internet or cell-phone networks, without any 
centralized curatorial control” (23). The key work here is control, and without the 
                                                 
11 See Groys, “From the Image to the Image File—and Back.” 
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traditional limits placed on the exhibition of art, the elite class is no longer the only 
audience with the privilege of consumption. 
Of course, when the digitized object is encountered, it is arguably found with the 
understanding that the original exists beyond the screen. For we still visit the museum—
we still attend the live performance. Theorist Douglas Davis, in a 1995 critique on 
Benjamin’s theory applied to digital media, asserts, “[Benjamin] erred in assuming that 
the world would bow to logic, that the endless reproduction of a painting or a photograph 
would diminish what he called the ‘aura’ of the original…We still bid wildly at auctions 
and employ armies of scholars to find the ‘original,’ the ‘authentic’ masterpiece” (384). 
While aura may be endangered by reproduction, authenticity gains more authority with 
the increasing amount of copies that proliferate. Benjamin’s examination of original and 
copy is furthered by Groys, a comparison that he defines as topological. Groys clarifies, 
“the original has a specific historical site, and it is through this site that the original is 
inscribed into history as a unique object. The copy, by contrast, is virtual, placeless, 
ahistorical; from the very beginning, it manifests itself as potential multiplicity” (26). 
This is not the culture industry’s sleight of hand, tricking us into thinking that what glows 
from our screen could possibly be an original. Adorno makes an observation in The 
Culture Industry that remains relevant to the new conditions of the digital age. He 
concludes, “Imagination is replaced by a mechanically relentless control mechanism 
which determines whether the latest imago to be distributed really represents an exact, 
accurate and reliable reflection of the relevant item of reality” (64). To contextualize his 
thinking in the present moment, I would argue that those at all familiar with digital 
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reproduction technology recognize, on some level, that what is encountered on their 
Instagram feed should not be considered an original—or at least should be done so with 
caution. But why, in an age of convenience, full of easy-to-access reproductions, are we 
still seeking the site of their creation? What is it about the authentic auratic experience 
that is still attracting the attention of mass culture?  
Considerations of music on a critical level have much to do, argues Christoph 
Cox12, with how humans have approached the concept and experience of music over the 
course of recorded history: it is either a thing of beauty or something purely mathematical 
(149). Cox points out that sounds—described as “invisible, intangible, and ephemeral 
entities”—have been regarded in the history of philosophy as secondary attributes of 
physical objects yet have little in common with the actual objects themselves (156). The 
human experience has maintained a rhythm throughout time, manifest in something far 
more fleeting than a brushstroke on canvas or the snap of a shutter. And while the more 
static history of art has been well-documented by critics and musicologists, this project 
explores the digital reproducibility of music in the 21st century as the backdrop for a 
larger conversation on the profundity of an artform’s mode of reproduction to alter the 
listener’s perception of self in a highly-connected yet fleetingly-authentic world. 
Sound as a secondary attribute to a primary object is worth considering in this 
multidimensional approach to aura and apperception. Adorno considers the ear and eye—
the audiovisual elements that typify the digital recording—as together but not equal:13 
                                                 
12 See Cox, “Beyond Representation and signification: Toward a sonic materialism.” 
13 See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music 
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“The ear is passive. The eye is covered by a lid and must be opened; the ear is open and 
must not so much turn its attention toward stimuli as seek protection from them” (51). If 
you have ever spent time editing the audio quality of a recording after its reproduction, 
his point instantly rings true: for while the individual in the crowd can pan the camera 
back and forth, their control over what the speakers capture is significantly limited by the 
entirety of the soundscape that surrounds them (i.e. screaming fans belting lyrics). The 
differential voluntarism involved in hearing with the human ear compared to seeing with 
the human eye is thus identical on a digital scale when capturing the live music 
performance. In typical Adornian style, the critic expands on passivity by stating, 
“Deterioration of the faculty of musical synthesis, of the apperception of music as an 
esthetic context of meaning, goes with relapsing into such passivity” (51). But consider 
for a moment what may be happening when the eye—the more active of the two—is 
handicapped by the optical lens of the camera: is one then focused on the performance or 
merely on the reproduction of the performance through the screen of the device?  
For there is the opportunity for passive listening in the age of digital reproduction: 
listening to music through headphones plugged into an iPhone is easy, much like many 
other (and arguably more important) aspects of the human experience that can be 
satisfied through the use of mobile phones. If you’re hungry, you make a call to order 
take-out; if you’re sick, you send a text message to cancel your date. Again, the level of 
convenience that digital devices bring to the 21st century table outnumbers those of the 
machine in the previous century. Convenience can be wonderful—we’ve all benefitted 
from being able to look up a word or to snap a quick photo on our mobile phones, what 
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today have evolved into hand-held computers capable of accessing the Internet nearly 
anywhere. But convenience often comes with a price. 
And these digital devices are still tools—just like the machine—and how we 
interpret them is determined by their use. The presence of mobile phones in public 
spaces, for example, is met with some trepidation, and, while they offer a higher degree 
of connectivity that is proven to aid in times of crisis, they also present an element of 
distraction that can be interpreted as a challenge to face-to-face communication. For 
instance, Adorno takes a desolate stance on technology’s social integration:14 “The neon 
signs which hang over our cities and outshine the natural light of the night with their own 
are comets presaging the natural disaster of society, its frozen death” (96). Is the digital 
device opening the door for new mediums of artistic creativity and communication, or is 
it pointing to their end? Nancy Baym, in her 2015 text, Personal Connections in the 
Digital Age, echoes these Adornian concerns by critically addressing society’s 
relationship with technology in the 21st century. “On the one hand, people express 
concern that our communication has become increasingly shallow,” she acknowledges. 
“On the other, new media offer the promise of more opportunity for connection with 
more people, leading to stronger and more diverse relationships” (1). Baym’s discussion 
of connection and digital communication technologies is yin and yang, a fair yet 
admittedly optimistic work in the field of media studies. The trend in critical theory since 
Benjamin (and before him, for that matter) has been to critique, and the overwhelming 
                                                 
14 See Adorno, The Culture Industry 
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adoption of digital technology into the lives of everyday people leads theorists to 
question these changes as their effects ripple outward. 
I would argue that anything new—unless it be some obvious and overwhelming 
improvement over what came before—is met with a certain degree of skepticism. Critic 
Brian House provides a sense of this critical reaction to culture and technology in his 
essay, “Against Listening.” Although not a total luddite, House is, as Baym would 
understand, cautious of the power of digital technology to influence culture. He declares, 
“Entangled in speakers, headphones, or VR headsets, the subject who is continually 
interpellated in acoustic ecology is the listener—eyes closed, head bowed, immobile, 
contemplative, concentrating, bored, or dreaming” (165). Making a comment similar to 
what Paul Valéry predicted in a 1928 essay15 also referenced in the “Work of Art” 
essay’s first section, House continues to suggest that, nearly a century later, “our social 
relationships are captured and capitalized by technological platforms.” Contrary, though, 
to what Valéry was only then beginning to uncover, House reveals that the acoustic 
economy of listening today is “more than just a matter of sound” (160). To give our full 
attention to sound—to this single axiom of experience—is a now artificial act in Western 
art practice (160). To some, it would seem that Adorno’s worst fears are not at all being 
assuaged in the digital age but are, in fact, being confirmed. 
Yet any technology is arguably invented and released into the world in the hope 
of bettering some process, making an aspect of daily life more convenient or easier. 
Baym gives a voice to the positive aspects of technology as she stresses, “there are still 
                                                 
15 See Valéry, “Conquest of Ubiquity.” 
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competing narratives between phones as ostentatious, expensive, stressful, and prone to 
creating bad manners and phones as assuring safety, autonomy, access to others, and 
control over the flow of daily life” (53). Many critics—and average technology users—
are unsure about the increasing reliance on technology in the present. But Baym leads us 
back to the optimistic, stating that digital devices, while capable of completely subsuming 
human experience, “offer the promise that we need never be out of touch with our loved 
ones, no matter how long the traffic jam in which we find ourselves. When stuck with our 
families, we may import our friends through our mobile devices” (11). When 
technologies are new, she implores, they often produce “social and cultural 
reorganization and reflection” (2). Baym concludes that these phenomena—digital media 
use, device portability, and constant connection—prompt us to question, as she states, 
“the very authenticity of our identities, relationships, and practices” (5). Thus, in my 
argument, the act of digitally reproducing the live song must not go unquestioned, both 
on the level of auratic integrity as well as human apperception and the individual’s sense 
of self. To understand the possibilities of digital reproduction and its current mass-
participation is not limited to, for example, a seasoned musician like David Byrne or a 
technology critic like Nancy Baym. Instead, I’m suggesting that anyone that has attended 
a live music performance of any nature can begin to think about how a desire to 
reproduce something as ephemeral as music with a device so closely integrated into their 
own life can answer unique questions surrounding the power of music, the authenticity of 
art, and individuality in an age of digital reproducibility—whether or not they knew to 
ask in the first place. 
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And while the experience of music in its basic form has always been ephemeral, 
music in the 21st century is rarely so. Digital reproducibility captures its existence and 
digitizes it into binary—turned into information. Archivist Nora Alter cautions the 
increased access to digital information in “Transformations of the Archive.” From an 
informational perspective, she considers the conversion of original works to digital 
information as “democratized in their dissemination,” which, in line with Benjamin’s 
aura, significantly deteriorates their singularity. More plainly, Alter illustrates, “The 
process of digitization transforms the heterogeneity of disparate and materially distinct 
media such as text, photographs, sound recordings, films, and the like, into a 
homogeneous mass of computer data” (156). The reproduction of the art object by means 
of digitization and the information imperative of the digital is another important avenue 
where Benjamin’s theory of aura and reproducibility breaks down. Instead of the 
“plurality of copies” that are produced by mechanical reproduction,16 it can be deduced 
that there is only one copy of the work of art—turned into binary—when digitally 
reproduced. Not only is the original work of art—in this case, the live music 
performance—being reproduced by means of technical reproducibility, the end result is 
constructed not by language or imagery but by numbers. Like Boris Groys, critical 
theorist Sabine Eckmann also focuses on digital images in her 2009 essay, “Aura, 
Virtuality, and the Simulacrum.” Yet she would appear to be on the side of a hypothetical 
Benjamin considering digitization’s shattering of artistic tradition. Eckmann articulates:  
                                                 
16 See Benjamin, “Work of Art,” p. 221. 
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While we may, for example, claim that abstract paintings are indexical of artistic 
subjectivity and figurative ones a mediation or reflection of the world in which we 
live, digitally conceived images, whether representative or abstract, if we take 
them literally, refer to not much more than a mathematical code that transcends 
linear time and actual space. Hence, according to the argument against digital art, 
the human gesture is ultimately broken and destroyed by the computer. (69) 
Eckmann’s claims are reminiscent of Benjamin’s remark: “that which withers in the age 
of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (221). Technical reproduction, 
as first posited by Benjamin, depletes the auratic integrity of an artwork; however, it 
could also—based on Eckmann’s statement above—involve and even higher level of 
degradation in today’s age of digital reproducibility. Not only is the work of art being 
reproduced by its metamorphosis through the binary matrix of the digital device, the 
device itself in the 21st century has become increasingly more omnipresent in the 
everyday lives of everyday people. No longer must one be a professional photographer to 
capture a beautiful image—one now need only reach into their pocket and frame it within 
their screen.  
This amateur/professional divide is the cornerstone of the 21st century digital 
revolution. In their introduction to After the Digital Divide? German Aesthetic Theory in 
the Age of New Media, Koepnick and McGlothlin observe, “the advent of modern mass 
media redefined what it might mean to engage in aesthetic activity in the first place” (7). 
Their introduction points out that the media of 19th and 20th century industrial culture 
allowed “the transport [of] culture to the masses rather than inviting select audiences to 
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stand in silent admiration in the face of the original” (9). Again, we are still in search of 
the aura produced by the plastic arts and the ephemerality of a more dynamic artform like 
music, but access to their unique reproductions is today far more widespread than ever 
before. And the capability of the individual to reproduce art, unlike in the age of 
Benjamin, no longer remains in the hands of the professional. After the Digital Divide 
later gives way to a conversation on the remix—the ability of the digital copy to be 
further manipulated following the act of reproduction. Of course, this was possible with 
analog forms of reproduction, such as photography. Benjamin foregoes an in-depth 
discussion on the modification of the photograph in order to highlight film. The cinematic 
process specifically is predicated on the ability to remix and modify after the moment of 
encounter, what is referred to as cutting—a vital aspect of the “equipment-free aspect of 
reality.” This, Benjamin indicates, is “the height of artifice” (233). Thus, by affording 
more opportunities to alter the work of art after the moment of its reproduction, one 
argument would conclude that there is an even greater deterioration of aura in the digital 
age. The basis for such an argument is furthered in the contemporary moment by Lev 
Manovich in his essay, “Remixability.” “Since the introduction of the first Kodak 
camera, users have had tools to create massive amounts of vernacular media,” he states. 
Before the advent of digital technology that was widely designed for and distributed to 
the public, Manovich points out that “the media pools of the amateur and those of the 
professional did not mix” (47-48). Thus, reproduction technology is sinking deeper into 
mass culture in the present moment because of its distribution as well as its user-friendly 
design. Given the logic that has thus far been shown, the present moment beholds a larger 
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audience with more opportunities to shatter the tradition of art practice. Thanks at least in 
part to Apple’s widespread marketing of their iPhone line, the 21st century, I argue, is 
witnessing not an equipment-free reality but an introduction to equipment that allows the 
user to engage in a potentially reality-free experience. As has already been framed by 
House and “Against Listening,” the digital device as a tool lends its user the ability to 
either escape their sonic surroundings with headphones or to capture an aspect of their 
reality to then remix it into something entirely different. Yet the promise of altered 
realities is not, unsurprisingly, left solely to the individual with the device.  
In an age of digital reproducibility, music is encountered everywhere: in 
advertisements, on car stereos, pumped through headphones emanating from digital 
devices—muting the physical space with a sonic topography that can transform the 
listener within and without. This transformation of space today can be as easy as reaching 
into your pocket. Baym observes in Personal Connections, “We may be physically 
present in one space, yet mentally and emotionally engaged elsewhere” (3). Would 
Benjamin consider this ability to transcend space an authentic experience? For many, as 
Adorno predicted long before the first iPhone came to life, first encounters with music 
are today often experienced “from mechanical means of mass reproduction” in a digitally 
mediated manner. The act of listening is crucial for Adorno, but a deeper concern is the 
means by which listening occurs. Adorno postulates whether “these means have thus 
raised the listening level” (1). If one has only experienced music through a mechanical or 
digital apparatus, has he or she truly experienced all that music has to offer? If the 
ephemeral nature of music is sacrificed (as Adorno is hinting at here), how will the aura 
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of the original ever be understood? Brian House has already suggested the rarity of 
completely sequestering the individual experience to a single mode of sense perception. 
Increased access to digital devices is not as simple as an increase in the listening level.  
Listening itself can constitute the abandoning of the body during the experience, 
but the introduction of a technological apparatus during said experience will always 
require use of the body. House is zeroing in on the “acoustic ecology” of listening—as an 
experience exclusively typified by the sense of hearing and nothing else. He argues that 
this acoustic economy tends to “sacralize listening,” transforming one of the five senses 
into an esoteric practice (159-160). House finds the tendency to seek out a technological 
middle-man—i.e. whipping out your iPhone to video the performance—to be a product 
of acoustemological conditioning (166), and he later refers to this conditioning as a 
technologically mediated act, bolstered by the attention economy ruled by social media. 
But this idea also falls in line with the digitally mediated musical experience.  
More to the point: to listen to the digital reproduction— entangled in speakers and 
headphones, as House would typify it—involves the use of the ear but is, as an action, 
facilitated by the body; hands plug in the earbuds, fingers tap the screen to curate the 
song, and then can one finally enjoy the sonic experience pumped directly into the ear. 
Studies focused on listening and the soundscape have benefitted from critic Salomé 
Voegelin and her 2014 work Sonic Possible Worlds: Hearing the Continuum of Sound. In 
a critical vein similar to the work produced by House, Voegelin argues that the socio-
political practice of sound, and the spaciotemporal aspect of music, can integrate a 
soundscape within the visual topography of individual or collective experience. She 
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solidifies this idea by explaining, “The soundscape makes accessible, audible and 
thinkable, alternative states of affairs that allow us to rethink and relive the materiality 
and semantics of the real world” (45). David Byrne17 complements Voegelin’s idea by 
writing on the power and possibilities of the individual music experience’s soundscape: 
“Music can get us through difficult patches in our lives by changing not only how we feel 
about ourselves, but also how we feel about everything outside ourselves” (9). Of course, 
the question remains unanswered as to whether or not Benjamin would approve of the 
possibilities of sonic worlds—as a shattering of tradition or a renaissance of sound art 
practice and consumption.  
The digital reproduction of the art object—like mechanical reproducibility that 
came before—necessitates the body, but as an act it occurs in space. Yet space in an age 
of digital reproduction is not strictly public or private. The device provides the affordance 
of choice to the individual user navigating a public space: does one engage with the 
world around them or shield them self in the sonic bubble constructed by headphones and 
a playlist? Baym continues to think about the complications of space in Personal 
Connections, yet she is approaching it from less of an individual standpoint than House. 
Where House is an individualist, Baym can be found on a more collectivist spectrum. 
Listening through headphones, “head bowed, immobile, contemplative, concentrating, 
bored, or dreaming,” per House, can completely remove the individual from whatever 
situation in which they find themselves. Steve J. Wurtzler18 compliments these 
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18 See Wurtzler, "One Future of Sound Studies Fits into the Palm of your Hand," 
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approaches to the personalized soundscape by arguing that the 21st century attention 
economy is largely influenced by the personal soundscape’s bubble of sonic protection, 
thanks in large part to headphones. According to Wurtzler, “tuning out” reverts the 
individual to their own soundscape. “When experienced through headphones,” Wurtzler 
continues, “handheld devices attest to a structural tension between the broadcast 
programmed music that increasingly fills public and semi-public spaces, and the private, 
portable, ubiquitous personal soundscapes” that are constructed through the digital device 
(171). Thus music, here again, is an exceptional case. Because of the deep societal 
integration of digital reproduction technology and the devices that make them possible, it 
is easy to understand Benjamin’s enthusiasm when he marvels, “The cathedral leaves its 
locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, performed in an 
auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room” (221). The reproduction—
during the time of Benjamin’s theses as well as in the present moment—is still music as 
had been heard, just in different spacetimes with an attached aura either geared toward a 
collective encounter (such as in shopping malls or the elevator) or the individual’s 
negation of it (by way of the headphones). 
Consumption and enjoyment of art during the age of mechanical reproduction was 
and had been a much more public experience. Of course, there could be found vast 
collections of art in private homes, but the gallery was, to a certain extent, created for the 
public exhibition of art. In the present moment’s reconfiguration of space, Baym asks, 
“As we lose connection to space, do we also become detached from those nearby whose 
social support comprised communities of old and on whose interconnections civil society 
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depends” (102)? When there is lack of a “single shared environment,” reveals Baym, “the 
metaphor of space quickly unravels” (101). Thus, by the device’s creation of a 
personalized space as a sort of bubble within a larger, public space, the integrity of the 
reproduction’s aura takes on an individualized meaning during both the reproduction 
process and each iteration of its future consumption.  
By studying live music, though, space is tantamount to time. While the plastic arts 
work in space and present an artificial representation of space, Dahlhaus reminds us that 
music also works in time, 19 “not merely in but also through temporal sequence by means 
of an artificial temporal exchange of tones” (9). When experiencing the original iteration 
of a song in all its ephemerality, one no longer has the opportunity to skip, pause, rewind, 
or fast-forward. There is only the moment of its encounter in time, which I would argue 
places the onus on the listener to appreciate as much of the experience as possible. 
Adorno, perhaps countering himself on an increased capacity to listen, laments20 that 
“humanity in the age of omnipresent radios and gramophones has actually forgotten the 
experience of music” (21). Is this why we continue to visit the museum? Is the constant 
barrage of musical reproduction herding us to the concert venue? If so, then why begin 
the process of reproduction anew once the performance begins? Katrina Somdahl-Sands 
and John C. Finn21 are not only thinking about the spacetime of the live performance, but 
also about the possibilities that reproducibility allows in a future time. They write, “the 
performance itself still fills that space between the performer and audience members, 
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20 See Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music. 
21 See Somdahl-Sands and Finn, “Media, Performance, and Pastpresents: Authenticity in the Digital Age.” 
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producing a reflexive understanding of the actions taking place” (813). But what happens 
when the iPhone is interjected, thrust between audience member and performer? Are 
these ephemeral moments being experienced to their full extent? Somdahl-Sands and 
Finn continue: “In the case of a mediated performance, the performance is connecting the 
real world (now-time) of the viewer with the mediated world (pastpresent time) of the 
performance” (813). The logic of digital reproduction understands that the reproduced 
copy will be recalled—or, in this case, replayed—at some point in the future, for some 
purpose. This was the case during Benjamin’s mechanical age, but today the possibilities 
that are allotted the digitally reproduced copy are far more dynamic than the arguably 
more static mechanical reproduction, transcending both space and time to operate in a 
multitude of other spacetimes. With so many varying opportunities for the work of art to 
be reproduced, remixed, encountered, and altered again, I would argue that authenticity 
and its meaning is challenged and, like aura, diminished. 
The static art object is no longer sufficient to represent the mode of human sense 
perception during an age in which technology enables the user to transcend both space 
and time—yet the adherence to aura’s crucial spacetime is not at all foregone. The 
ephemerality of music—of sound, audio, fleeing space and time—complicates 
Benjamin’s approach in that the shift in the realm of reproducibility from the mechanical 
to the digital involves a reevaluation not only of aura’s spacetime, but of the art object’s 
spacetime as well. What would be considered the “original” work of music in the age of 
digital reproducibility (or mechanical reproducibility for that matter)? Is it the encounter 
by the audience during the live performance, or is it the more official and distributed 
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studio recording? To play with the dialectics of Benjamin’s aura in the 21st century, the 
unique spacetime of music is the perfect venue to reevaluate the authenticity of art and 
human experience together. For the authentic is arguably more difficult to encounter—
whether due to the affordances of quality in the digital reproduction, the integrity of the 
object’s aura that has arguably changed in the digital age, or the proliferation of copies 
(perhaps more appropriately, the singular digital copy that can be so widely distributed) 
that can be encountered across space and time and devices and platforms. 
For a mechanically reproduced copy is an arguably less drastic transformation 
than its modern counterpart, the digital reproduction. The digitally reproduced work of 
art—considering the information aspect of its reproduction process—can be seen as far 
more dynamic, albeit troubling, in its transformation from the original work of art into 
the reproduction as information: captured, stored, modified, and redistributed within the 
device. As early as the 1990s, Douglas Davis comments on the dynamism of the digitally 
reproduced art object: “in the age of digital reproduction [the work of art] is physically 
and formally chameleon” (381, emphasis added). Davis is beginning a renewed 
understanding of aura as “supple and elastic,” far more so than Benjamin could have 
imagined in the first half of the 20th century. The elasticity of aura in the digital age 
stretches into the deeper, more personalized realm of the individual’s approach to the 
reproduction, an aura described by Davis to be “unique, personal, quivering with the 
sense of self” (382). And with the reproduction’s potentially-personalized meaning being 
disseminated through the information highways of the Internet and into mobile phones, 
the consistency of its aesthetic quality—its semblance to the original object—must also 
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adapt to its increased distribution. The information imperative of digital reproduction and 
the elasticity of its aura presented by Davis allow the reproduction today to be not only 
effortlessly copied as before, but also “endlessly reproduced without degradation, always 
the same, always perfect” (382). This digital activity occurs outside of the vacuum of 
Benjamin’s spacetime and, thus, does not precipitate a loss in the clarity of the art object. 
The loss in clarity by means of “analog reproduction”—as Davis typifies it—is compared 
to a series of waves crashing on the beach: “breaking over and over but never precisely in 
the same form… just as the copy of the audio or video signal before would always 
involve a loss in clarity” (382). Thus, not only does the digitally reproduced work of art 
withstand a loss in clarity compared to the original, it is also reproducible by devices that, 
unlike the photographic technology of Benjamin’s era, are intensely portable, accessible, 
and in the hands (or pockets) of millions.  
 While the aura of the mechanically reproduced object was diminished in relation 
to the loss in quality of the copy, I can argue here that digital reproduction of the art 
object—due to the lack of a loss in clarity—has different consequences for the aura of the 
reproduction. Quality becomes a concern, for example, when choosing between a camera 
loaded with film and one equipped with a digital lens. The tradition of analog 
photography is still continued today, yet, to comment on the photography of Benjamin’s 
age, there is a drastic difference in the clarity and focus of those reproductions. Although 
Benjamin was no technology expert on a scale of equipment, he hints in another essay, 
his “Little History of Photography,” that “the most precise technology can give its 
products a magical value” (510). The magic value of the reproduction today can be seen 
 36 
in both manual photographic reproduction and its digital iteration. Choosing traditional 
film over digital storage produces a reproduction, in this example of photography, with 
an auratic value noticeably different from the crisp quality of the digital. Furthermore, 
and to risk this analysis digressing into the specifics of digital reproduction technology, I 
would argue that the cameras built into an iPhone (of any generation since its launch in 
2007) wildly surpass those that Benjamin would have known. 
I end this section with a powerful mediation on the magic value still inherent in 
the reproduction. This is Benjamin writing in his “Little History of Photography” essay, 
and I find it to be the most succinct and appropriate conclusion to the power of aura and 
its influence on apperception, still retaining its relevance well into the 21st century:  
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject, 
the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of 
contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the 
subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-
forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may 
rediscover it. (510) 
Therefore, the ephemerality of live music can be readily captured by everyday audience 
members with their digital devices and then replayed far beyond its encounter. Until 
recently, the recording of a live music performance was an arduous task of equipment 
and coordination, a production that involved more time and collective contribution to 
realize the final product. Today, to reproduce the live music performance is done on such 
an individual scale as to render each iteration with an aura still arguably diminished 
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compared to the original, authentic experience, yet one more personalized and significant 
to the user. The aura of the original is so powerful that even its diminishment through 
process reproduction is substantial enough to elicit pause in the viewer, one that will 
continue to permeate the digital confines of its stored location to be remixed, replayed, 
and rediscovered in a limitless number of spacetimes.  
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EPHEMERALITY FOUND: 
AUTHENTICITY OF SELF 
When music is reproduced and replayed—ripped from its ephemerality yet with 
new affordances of recreated space, time, and experience—it can be carried anywhere via 
portable platforms like the iPhone. The agility of the digitally reproduced music 
performance illustrates the chameleon-like nature of aura that Douglas Davis highlights 
above. This adaptability is not only indicative of the affordances mobile phones grant the 
user in capturing and consuming art, but also of their capability as communication tools 
no longer bound to a fixed location. To contextualize this point, Nancy Baym 
emphasizes22 that “media vary in their mobility.” She considers media’s mobility by 
being either portable or stationary. Baym writes that portable media “[enable] people to 
send and receive messages regardless of location.” Stationary media, on the other hand, 
“[require] that people be in specific locations in order to interact” (11). The iPhone as a 
mobile device—albeit not alone—arguably represents the peak of mobility in the digital 
age, exemplified in the ease by which everyday users can now reproduce the live music 
experience—one that involves both the audible and visual sensorium. Benjamin’s 
understanding of the mode of 20th century photography, in retrospect, limited his 
observations on human apperception. The “Work of Art” essay comments on the desire to 
eliminate distance, but this desire today is well-incorporated into 21st century life. 
Furthermore, I would argue that this desire has been satisfied by the proliferation of 
mobile devices that have become ubiquitous in modern life. This is not to say that the 
                                                 
22 See Baym, Personal Connections. 
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elimination of distance has ended—in fact, it has arguably been amplified within the 
conscience of everyday living. 
The ubiquity of digital devices like the iPhone is bolstered by both portability and 
functionality. These aspects are eventually translated to the reproduction of the art object 
in that the original can be captured and transported far away from its place of origin—
rendering it more portable—and can be furthered modified—thus functioning outside of 
its original intent—far beyond the moment of encounter. Somdahl-Sands and Finn 
consider the consumption of the digitally reproduced copy in the past and present as what 
I would argue to be a metaphor for furthering the concept of portability—transporting the 
reproduction not only through space, but through time. “The mediated performance is 
[the audience member’s] now,” they write. However, it is made clear, “Through a 
mediated performance, a past performance and a present moment are collapsed into a 
pastpresent” (812-813). The challenge of space was the primary influence on Benjamin’s 
critique of aura and reproducibility, shown through his critique on distance. Today, 
however, there is the added dimension of time which complicates an approach to digital 
reproducibility as an understanding of human apperception and sense of self. Not only 
does the digital reproduction transcend space—as did its mechanically-captured 
predecessor—I argue that it has the ability to compress or expand the viewer’s sense of 
time during its secondary encounter. Not only can the device stage the reproduction of 
audio using built-in microphones, its screen presents dynamic images captured through 
the camera function that further contributes to the proliferation and reproduction of the 
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work of art. In an introductory quip by Wurtzler,23 he maintains, “[portable devices] 
instantiate both the live and the recorded. They inhabit the realm not of ‘either/or’ but 
instead of ‘not only but also’” (170). The not-only-but-also element of the live recording 
parallels with the idea of the pastpresent presented by Somdahl-Sands and Finn above. 
The ephemerality of music and its digital reproduction, therefore, not only operates in 
time but, as has been shown, space as well. Both time and space, like the relationship 
between the integrity of aura and the mode of apperception, are closely linked in the 
reproduction of the live music performance.  
Authenticity, while still sought out by mass culture, continues to be endangered 
for both aura and apperception: what does it mean for a thing—an object, an experience, 
a thought—to be authentic? Would an individual’s personal recording of a concert hold 
more auratic integrity than a production like The Beastie Boys’ Awesome? Digital 
technologies—especially those like the iPhone and its use during the auratic experience 
of live music performance—ultimately lead to the questioning of not only what it means 
for the work of art to be authentic but also, as Baym reveals, “what it means to be 
authentically human” (178). The world can now be contextualized through digital 
devices, but is this contextualization an authentic representation of individual reality and 
sense of self? Does a collection of reproductions function as a kind of collage by which to 
see through the binary of digital reproduction and the authentic art experience behind it? 
While the work of art is not the only thing in contemporary society being digitally 
reproduced, its reproducibility is arguably illustrative of the wide-spread incorporation of 
                                                 
23 See Wurtzler, "One Future of Sound Studies Fits into the Palm of your Hand." 
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communication and information technology into modern society. Baym ends her 
Personal Connections by stating, “Digital media aren’t saving us or ruining us. They 
aren’t reinventing us. But they are changing the ways we relate to others and ourselves in 
countless, pervasive ways” (177). From the telegraph to the Internet, technology has 
quickly opened the door for the dissemination of information on a scale that mirrored 
what was made possible with machines such as the cotton gin or Henry Ford’s assembly 
line. Convenience is the siren song of progress, and machines not only helped to make 
work more efficient but have also led to advances in the way humans could communicate 
in their time of leisure. The communication imperatives of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries have revolutionized the world of individual experience and have empowered 
mass culture with tools that would have been inconceivable by Benjamin in the 1930s. 
But with such an increased ability to reproduce the art object by both professional and 
nonprofessional individuals, I have argued in this essay that society’s sense of 
individuality has become sorely limited.  
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CONCLUSION; OR, ENCORE 
Are we losing a sense of community and connection with the art object by the 
distracting nature of the screen? Is this simply another form of “commodity listening,” a 
“reception in a state of distraction” of the art object and a shallow negation of the full 
capacity of the aura? And, more importantly, what makes the lover of art reach into their 
pocket for their iPhone in the first place? The key difference in an age of digital 
reproducibly is that mobile devices are being used as part of the process of apperception, 
allowing the individual to contextualize the complex and ever-changing world through 
their device. Douglas Davis understands this as society attempting “to find ways to 
increase the power of our subjective presence in the other reality, precisely as the painter 
orders his or her field” (385). Thus, the attempt to arrest the ephemeral experience before 
it is gone can be read as frustration over a sense of self away from the digital. Nancy 
Baym24 puts it this way: “The social concerns that we voice when we discuss technology 
are concerns that we would have even if there were no technology around” (55).  
Communication technologies provide devices—tools—that can be used to better 
understand the complexity of modern life, a way to slow things down while 
simultaneously keeping pace with the quickening flow of mass culture. Arresting the art 
object, attempting to bring it closer, transporting its reproduction—these all indicate a 
perception of contemporary life as constantly changing and, indeed, chameleon.  
Is the time right to consider what may come after the age of digital 
reproducibility? Davis leaves us with the following: “Only the unwary mind would deny 
                                                 
24 See Baym, Personal Connections.  
 43 
the further inevitability that a ‘neurasthenic’ computer, programmed by humanoid 
codes…will shortly create paintings form first stroke to last” (383). Perhaps digital 
reproducibility will continue to grow in its sphere of influence over human apperception, 
and it will arguably produce more artforms as the age progresses. Mass culture, of course, 
will always be receptive—albeit weary at times—of new technology, but it will not give 
its nod of approval willingly and immediately. How technology is used, how art is 
reproduced, is largely up to the individual. While it is still difficult to observe the full 
societal effects of reproducibility in the 21st century, the integrity of aura is indeed still 
intact—flexible yet decidedly altered since the time of Benjamin’s critique. Human 
apperception will continue to conform to changes within mass culture and will perhaps 
shift away from being framed by a troubled sense of self. Yet, at the rate of change by 
which the tradition of the present moment is constantly shattered, what the future holds—
for both the lover of art and the wielder of technology—is just as uncertain today as 
would today have been for Benjamin.   
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